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Long before Senator Charles Grassley tweeted support for Brett
Kavanaugh or held hearings on the dangers of Facebook, he focused his
attention on a more pious part of society—churches. Specifically, Grassley
led a charge in the early 1980s to hamstring the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS” or “Service” or “Agency”) in its ability to approach houses of
worship regarding matters related to their tax-exempt status. These efforts
resulted in the passage of the Church Audit Procedures Act (“CAPA”) in
1984, which requires approval from a high-level Treasury official before
the Service can so much as send a church a letter. Due to the IRS’ regional
organization at the time, the statute declared that a regional official of a
certain rank would be the appropriate high-level official.
Several years later, Congress again trained its sights on the IRS,
forcing the Service to reorganize from a regional structure to a centralized
one. As a result, CAPA immediately became unworkable as regional
officials no longer existed in the agency to approve church tax inquiries.
With no direct guidance from Congress on how to address this problem, the
IRS applied an administrative patch and designated a new official under
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the new organizational chart. Soon thereafter, a religious organization,
claiming to be a church, challenged the IRS on their selection in Federal
court. The IRS lost the suit. Since that time, an awkward and unnecessary
pattern emerged where the IRS attempted to fix this problem, only to be
sued for its efforts and then lose in court.
While there is a path forward for the IRS to unilaterally fix its
relationship with houses of worship, it is a far better exercise for Congress
to intervene. The likely result of this intervention is to amend the text of the
statute to reflect the current agency organization. The better approach,
however, is to do away with CAPA entirely and bring churches into the
regulatory fold.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1949, George Orwell published his vision of the year 1984. He
portrayed a time and place where the level of trust between citizens and
their government was marked with fear and unrest.1 In the actual year
1984, a small contingent of the population found his words prescient.
Houses of worship were subject to regulation by the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”), but the boundaries of that relationship remained unclear.
Tension largely existed due to an ambiguous framework set in place by
Congress in the 1960s. To fix the confusion previously created, Congress
sought a new way forward to govern this relationship. Its effort resulted in
the passage of the Church Audit Procedures Act (“CAPA”).2 This
legislation left the IRS with higher hurdles to overcome in its enforcement
efforts of churches, and it offered more certainty in the agency’s authority.
CAPA made life for the IRS more difficult in some respects, but it also
clarified expectations of the regulators and the regulated. Orwell’s words
once more seemed appropriate: “Perhaps one did not want to be loved so
much as to be understood.”3
The relationship between the IRS and the religious community was
mostly uneventful for the remainder of the 1980s and into the 1990s, but a
new century brought about a new problem. Congress ordered a sweeping
reorganization of the IRS in 1998 that created a litany of textual issues in
statutes enacted under the pre-1998 organization.4 CAPA, which makes
explicit reference to the old organizational chart, became particularly
unworkable. Neither Congress nor the IRS acted quick enough to reestablish clarity. Indeed, an under-resourced IRS attempted half measures,5
which added to the uncertainty, drawing criticism from scholars and
practitioners alike.6 For a time, the IRS seemed to have virtually stopped
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies & Taxation / Assistant Dean, School of Business,
Georgia Gwinnett College. The author previously worked as an attorney for the Office of
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, where he was a principal author of the proposed
regulations associated with the Church Audit Procedures Act—the subject matter of this
manuscript.1 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin Books 1961).
2
Church Audit Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1033(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1034
(1984).
3
Orwell, supra note 1, at 252.
4
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a), 112
Stat. 685, 689 (1998).
5
See generally Amendments to the Regulations Regarding Questions and Answers
Relating to Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations, 74 Fed. Reg. 39003-01 (Aug. 5, 2009)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
6
See, e.g., J. Michael Martin, Why Congress Adopted the Church Audit Procedures
Act and What Must Be Done Now to Restore the Law for Churches and the IRS, 29 AKRON
TAX J. 1, 3-4 (2013); Letter from All. Defense Fund to the IRS, Re: Proposed Amendments
to the Regulations Relating to Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations (Nov. 2, 2009);
Letter from Caplin & Drysdale to IRS, RE: Proposed Amendments to the Regulations
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regulating churches altogether.7
Given the current state of affairs, now is the time to rethink the
government’s approach to regulating houses of worship. At a minimum,
the courts or Congress should clarify on how to interpret CAPA.
Alternatively, Congress can acknowledge that CAPA was largely a
political overreaction from its inception, as well as an unnecessary burden
on an over-worked division of the Service, and thus consider eliminating
the statute altogether. The untenable path would be a continuation of the
inaction and tentative steps taken by the IRS, courts, and Congress in
recent years.
Part II of this manuscript offers a brief history of the IRS’ role in
regulating houses of worship, with an emphasis on how Congress
intervened to change the rules in the late twentieth-century and a discussion
of why those rules need to be changed once more. Part III explains how
the current approach taken by the IRS to regulate churches is both muddled
and largely unsustainable given the current agency organization and
resources. Finally, Part IV proposes ways to alleviate the regulatory
burden on the IRS, primarily suggesting a revision or elimination of CAPA
and possibly bringing houses of worship into the regulatory fold along with
similarly situated non-profit organizations.
II. TWENTIETH-CENTURY EVOLUTION
A. The Regulatory Role of the IRS
There is some debate of how long the IRS has been overseeing the
religious community’s compliance with the tax code. While the first tax
act codified in the wake of the Sixteenth Amendment authorized IRS
oversight,8 it was not until the 1940s that the IRS took concrete steps to
hold exempt organizations accountable.9 Until about 1970, organizations
Relating to Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations (Oct. 13, 2009).
7
See FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, FFRF Sues IRS to Enforce Church
Electioneering Ban (Nov. 14, 2012), https://ffrf.org/news/news-releases/item/16091-ffrfsues-irs-to-enforce-church-electioneering-ban (“The Freedom From Religion Foundation is
taking the [IRS] to court over its failure to enforce electioneering restrictions against
churches . . . . A widely circulated Bloomberg news article quoted Russell Renwicks, with
the IRS’ Tax-Exempt and Government Entities division, saying the IRS has suspended tax
audits of churches.”).
8
Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat.114, (1913); see also Lloyd Hitoshi
Mayer, The Better Part of Valour Is Discretion: Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its
Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 80 (2016).
9
Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 78-235, 58 Stat. 21, 21; Revenue Bill of 1943, S.
Rep. No. 78-627, at 21; see also Benjamin W. Akins, State of Confusion: A Non-Profit’s
Right to Withhold Donor Information from State Regulators, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J.
427, 429 (2017).
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had no legal requirement to even apply for an exemption from income
tax.10
Once the requirements were in place however, non-profit
organizations fulfilled their compliance obligations through forms
prescribed by the IRS.11 Not all organizations were required to file returns
initially and several are still exempt from the filing requirement today.12
Notably, houses of worship remain eligible for tax exempt status without
filing an application with the Service.13
For exempt organizations required to file returns, there are two
obligations. First, the organization must file an initial application for
exemption, which is typically accomplished through filing Form 1023.14
This requirement, which began in the mid-twentieth century, was
periodically tweaked and significantly reformed in 2014.15 In this reform,
the IRS debuted a far less burdensome process for certain qualifying
organizations.16 This streamlined and less pervasive form was titled Form
1023-EZ, borrowing a suffix from the other forms in the IRS repertoire that
are—as one might guess—”easy” for individuals and organizations to
complete and file.17
10

Mayer, supra note 8, at 83; see also John Montague, The Law and Financial
Transparency in Churches: Reconsidering the Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
203, 210–12 (2013).
11
The main version of the application for exemption is the Form 1023, Application for
Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and the
annual information return is the Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Overview of Present-Law Rules and Description
of Certain Proposals Relating to Disclosure of Information by Tax-Exempt Organizations
with Respect to Political Activities, JCX 59-00 (June 19, 2000).
12
See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A) (2018) (noting that filing requirements are not applicable
to “(i) churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches, (ii)
any organization (other than a private foundation . . .) described in subparagraph (C), the
gross receipts of which . . . are normally not more than $5,000, or (iii) the exclusively
religious activities of any religious order.”).
13
Id.
14
See generally U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form
1023, (Washington, D.C.: 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023.pdf.
15
See Mayer, supra note 8, at 82.
16
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form 1023-EZ,
(Washington, D.C.: 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1023ez.pdf and Instructions for
Form 1023-EZ (Washington, D.C.: 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1023ez.pdf
(available to certain types of entities with $50,000 or less annual gross receipts that have
$250,000 or less of total assets); Mayer, supra note 8, at 103 (“For the organizations that are
eligible to use the new form, however, relatively minimal information is required and, most
importantly, certain key requirements are deemed satisfied as long as an appropriate official
of the organization attests that they have been met.”).
17
See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form 1040EZ, (Washington, D.C.: 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1040ez—2017.pdf; U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form 5500-EZ, (Washington: D.C.,
2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f5500ez—2018.pdf; U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form 990-EZ, (Washington D.C.: 2018),
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The second obligation is for tax-exempt entities to file annual
information returns.18 The scope of these filings depends on the size and
type of the organizations. This filing requirement provides organizations
with a way to report their operational and financial information to the IRS.
This is accomplished yearly on some derivation of the Form 990.19 The
form, first revealed as a two page document in the mid-1900s, has
blossomed into a dozen pages with nearly 10-times that in instructions.20
Various mutations of the original Form 990 have also crept into the
reporting regime.21 Most notably, Form 990-N, dubbed the “e-postcard,”
marked the lowest compliance burden yet for filers in the non-profit sector,
allowing small organizations22 to submit a short online disclosure each
year.23
For organizations—like churches—that are still outside of the
mandatory filing regime, the Service’s regulatory role is discernably
harder. The U.S. tax system is based on a system of voluntary compliance
which the IRS ensures by requiring individuals and organizations to inform
the IRS that they are compliant.24 The entities that remain unobligated to
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ez.pdf.
18
26 U.S.C.S. § 6033(a)(1) (2019).
19
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Form 990,
(Washington, D.C.: 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf.
20
See Akins, supra note 9, at 429.
21
See Akins, supra note 9, at 429 (“[A] host of related filing regimes have stemmed
from Form 990 - e.g., Form 990-N, Form 990-PF, and Form 990-EZ—all serving various
types of non-profits based on their size, revenue, and status. The purpose of the Form is to
facilitate the collection of information required by IRC section 6033.”) (internal citations
omitted).
22
“Small” in this regard is defined as an entity with yearly receipts of $50,000 or less.
See Annual Electronic Filing Requirement for Small Exempt Organizations, IRS.gov,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/annual-electronic-filing-requirement-for-smallexempt-organizations-form-990-n-e-postcard (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
23
The form calls for only eight pieces of mostly innocuous information, such as:
Employer identification number, tax year, name and address, principal officer, website
address, verification that organization is eligible to file the e-postcard, and (if necessary) a
statement indicating organization’s plans to dissolve. See Information Needed to File ePostcard, IRS.gov, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/information-needed-to-file-epostcard (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
24
See, e.g., Jack Manhire, There Is No Spoon: Reconsidering the Tax Compliance
Puzzle, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 623, 624 (2015) (“Voluntary compliance is fundamental to a
government with a self-reporting tax administration policy enforced by a relatively small
number of audits. For example, approximately ninety-eight percent of the tax revenues the
U.S. government collects is from taxpayers who voluntarily file their returns and timely pay
the tax legally due.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Jack Manhire, Essay: What Does
Voluntary Tax Compliance Mean?: A Government Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 11
(2015) (“If government statistics are correct, almost all of us engage in what the IRS calls
‘voluntary tax compliance’. . . . In most congressional reports, the IRS emphasizes voluntary
taxpayer compliance as a foundational principle of the U.S. tax system.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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file are, nevertheless, still required to comply with the tax laws and
regulations, and the IRS is still tasked with making sure that they are doing
so. Here, the IRS must use other means to discover, investigate and correct
noncompliance. This, as is reasonable to assume, is burdensome—and it is
no small issue. There are at least 300,000 such organizations operating
under the banner of tax-exempt churches in the United States.25 Indeed,
this number represents nearly twenty percent of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) section 501(c) organizations that are on file with the IRS.26 Aside
from the danger of an organization’s non-compliance going undetected due
to the lack of information given to the IRS, the Service is also at a
disadvantage in identifying general trends of non-compliance in the
religious community—which means the agency must steer blind when it
comes to concentrating its education and enforcement efforts.27 In these
situations, the government must largely resort to third-party information
like newspaper articles and whistleblowers.28
The Service’s ability and wherewithal to monitor the many exempt
organizations under its authority has ebbed and flowed over the past fifty
years.29 Largely, it has been constrained by budgetary30 and political

25
See Montague, supra note 10, at 206 (estimating that there are “more than 330,000
churches in the United States.”) (citing Nat’l Council of The Churches of Christ In The
U.S.A., Yearbook of American & Canadian Churches 2012, 377 (2012)); Mayer, supra note
8, at 85 (estimating “that churches currently number approximately 300,000 . . . .”).
26
See Mayer, supra note 8, at 84 (noting that in 2014, there were 1,568,454 IRC
section 501(c) organizations on file with the IRS (citing IRS Data Book 2014, at 58)).
27
See Montague, supra note 10, at 206–07 (“For the most part, neither the IRS nor the
public has any idea what these churches are doing with the donations they receive . . . . As a
group, churches have less oversight than any other major institution in America today.”
(internal citations omitted)).
28
See, e.g., Montague, supra note 10, at 208 (noting that Sen. Charles Grassley
selected the six churches for his much publicized 2007 investigation based on “investigative
reports by local newspapers and tips from charity watchdog groups.” (citing Laurie
Goodstein, Senator Questioning Ministries on Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at
A21)).
29
See Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach, COLUM. UNIV.
ACAD.
COMMONS
2
(2013),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8154F1D (noting that the Service
made a push in the mid-twentieth century to more frequently audit foundations, but its
production quickly declined again by 1970).
30
Id. at 4 (citing 2006 IRS Data Book, 56 tbl. 25) (commenting that while the number
of tax-exempt entities is ever increasing, “IRS staffing and other resources dedicated to taxexempt organization oversight have fallen or remained stagnant, and there is no evidence
that historic levels of oversight have been adequate to ensure that significant abuses can be
identified and addressed in a timely manner.”); see also Leandra Lederman, IRS Reform:
Politics As Usual?, 7 COLUM. J. TAX L. 36, 73–74 (2016) (internal citations omitted)
(“TIGTA . . . reported that the reduction in the IRS’s budget of almost $1.2 billion (in
absolute dollars) between 2010 and 2015 resulted in a smaller work force, reduced tax
collections, reduced case closures by revenue officers, and reduced service to taxpayers.”).
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concerns.31 Further, Congress has helped and hurt the agency’s efforts by
ordering various reorganizations of the agency throughout the twentieth
century.32 The remainder of this part of the manuscript focuses on two key
events—both works of the Legislature—that greatly altered the landscape
of how the IRS relates to churches during this timeframe.
B. The 1980s and the Passage of CAPA
The Service’s history of regulating houses of worship is a small part
of its larger story of regulating all the nation’s individuals and entities.
Stepping back and looking more broadly at that story reveals a complex
history. Put in the position of administering often unpopular laws, the
Service has perennially been the face of an unwelcome statutory regime.33
That is to say, the public has always had an opinion of the agency’s actions,
and the non-profit sector—including houses of worship—is no exception.34
In the mid-twentieth century, the perception of the IRS was especially
bad. Many saw the IRS as largely politicized by the Executive branch,35
and Congress held hearings in order to investigate what their constituents
viewed as unfettered agency abuses.36 Some of its dealings became all too
31

See Lederman, supra note 30, at 76 (citing Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration, Reduced Budgets and Collection Resources Have Resulted in Declines in
Taxpayer Service, Case Closures, and Dollars Collected, Dept. of the Treasury (May 8,
2015) (“Some in Congress have stated that the IRS budget cuts, which began in 2011, are
punishment for bad behavior.”)); House Ways and Means Majority Staff Report, Doing Less
With Less: IRS’s Spending Decisions Harm Taxpayers (Apr. 22, 2015) (internal citation
omitted); see also David A. Herzig, Justice For All: Reimagining The Internal Revenue
Service, 33 VA. TAX REV. 1, 21-22 (2013) (citing Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 106th
cong., rep. of Investigation of Allegations Relating to Internal Revenue Service Handling of
Tax-Exempt Organization Matters 6-13 (Comm. Print 2000)). (“As can be seen through the
history of the Service, the agency is inherently political in nature. It answers to two masters:
Congress and the Executive . . . Essentially, the Service has been accused of using the audit
process for political purposes.”).
32
See, e.g., Owens, supra note 29, at 3 (discussing how Congress created and
eliminated various assistant commissioner and director positions in the exempt organization
area of the IRS from the 1970s through current day).
33
See Samuel D. Brunson, Watching the Watchers: Preventing I.R.S. Abuse of the Tax
System, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 223, 224–25 (2013).
34
See, e.g., Tony Perkins, IRS to Churches: Be Audit You Can Be, Washington Update
(Aug.
8,
2014)
https://www.ok.gov/triton/modules/newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=258&article_id=14
548 (asserting that the IRS plans to censor churches as part of its “intimidation tour.”).
35
See David Burnham, Misuse of the I.R.S.: The Abuse of Power, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 3,
1989),
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/03/magazine/misuse-of-the-irs-the-abuse-ofpower.html (arguing that the Johnson and Nixon administrations weaponized the IRS to
combat those protesting for civil rights and against the Vietnam war, and that such executive
misuse may date back to Franklin Roosevelt’s tenure).
36
Id. (noting that, in the 1960s, Senator Edward Long held publicized hearings on
possible improper wiretapping by the IRS; in the 1970s, Senator Joseph Montoya
determined to hold hearings on the agency’s performance; and, in the 1980s, the House
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public, garnering unwanted scrutiny, and its relationship with religious
organizations took center stage. While the agency’s highly dramatic,
decades-long war with the Church of Scientology gained most of the
headlines during this time,37 there was a bigger—less Hollywood-esque—
storm brewing regarding how the agency approached entities claiming that
are churches. In the 1980s, Congress became acutely motivated to act
based on what it viewed as inappropriate actions of the Service toward a
handful of churches.38 The culmination of Congress’ interest in this area
was the passage of CAPA in 1984,39 which represented the most restrictive
effort yet to ensure the IRS did not overreach in its involvement with these
organizations.40
The first framework Congress put in place for how the IRS
approached, communicated with, and examined churches came fifteen
years earlier in 1969.41 Here, Congress had, for the first time, given
express authority to the Service to examine a church when it added a
provision for a tax on any unrelated business income of churches.42 As a
corollary, Congress added IRC section 7605(c), which stated that churches

convened for a hearing on potential corruption in the IRS); see also David Shribman,
Lament
of
The
Regan
I.R.S.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
4,
1982),
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/04/business/lament-of-the-reagan-irs.html (“Gradually,
in Congressional hearings, internal reviews and independent investigations, a startling truth
is emerging here: The Internal Revenue Service, once the most feared of Government
agencies, is in danger of becoming something of a paper tiger.”).
37
See Hugh B. Urban, Fair Game: Secrecy, Security, and the Church of Scientology in
Cold War America, 74 J. AM. ACAD. REL. 2, 356, 378 (Apr. 26, 2006) (internal citation
omitted) (“Since the early 1970s, Scientology has come into a series of conflicts . . . [with
the] IRS, regarding its status as a religious organization and its involvement in an array of
alleged criminal activities . . . . [T]he Church undertook an elaborate operation that included
intensive litigation in courts, a public relations campaign, and, finally, penetration of the
IRS intelligence division and chief counsel’s office . . . . In the end, however, the spying
Scientologists were caught.”).
38
See Church Audit Procedures Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the I.R.S. of the Comm. On Finance, 98th Cong. 2 (Sept. 30, 1983) [hereinafter CAPA
Hearings].
39
Church Audit Procedures Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1033(a), 98 Stat. 494.
40
See Reka P. Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax
Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 93 (1991) (“The new
rules severely restrict the Service’s audit inquiry of churches and affiliated organizations.”).
41
See 26 U.S.C. § 7605 (1970).
42
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-14, 7605(c) (1970); see Hoff, supra note 40, at 81 (quoting
Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906, 948) (noting that, in 1950, Congress first
“imposed an income tax on the unrelated business income of certain exempt organizations
and in this connection narrowed the category of ‘religious organizations’ exempt from the
annual reporting requirement and from the tax on unrelated business income to ‘church [or]
a convention or association of churches’.”) (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91172, 83 Stat. 487, 536-37) (“The Tax Reform Act of 1969 amended the 1954 Code to
impose a tax on the unrelated business income of churches.”).
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were free from unreasonable audits.43 The first sentence of subpart (c)
read:
No examination of the books of account of a
church . . . shall be made to determine whether such an
organization may be engaged in the carrying on of an
unrelated trade or business . . . unless the Secretary . . .
believes that such organization may be so engaged and so
notifies the organization in advance of the examination.44
The second sentence read:
No examination of the religious activities of such an
organization shall be made except to the extent necessary
to determine whether such organization is a church . . . and
no examination of the books of account of such an
organization shall be made other than to the extent
necessary to determine the amount of tax imposed by this
title.45
The interplay of the two sentences in IRC section 7605(c) led to a
difference in interpretation between the IRS and practitioners.46
Specifically, practitioners sought clarification on whether the second
sentence—prescribing the circumstances in which the Service could
examine a church’s “religious activities”—applied to any examination of a
church or only one involving unrelated business income.47 The IRS’
stance, made official in regulations in 1971, was that it had the authority to
audit the religious activities of a church outside of the restrictions of IRC
section 7605(c) as long as the Service was not engaged in an unrelated
business income audit.48 This garnered pushback from several religious
groups, and such pushbacks formed the rocky beginnings of Congress’
attempt to make good neighbors of the two parties.49

43

See Martin, supra note 6, at 5–6.
I.R.C. § 7605(c) (1965). The statute defines “Secretary” as “such officer being no
lower than a principal internal revenue officer for an internal revenue region.”.
45
Id.
46
See Thomas A. Shaw, Tax Audits of Churches, 22 CATH. LAW. 247, 249–51 (1976);
see also United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629, 630–32 (9th Cir. 1982).
47
See Shaw, supra note 46, at 249–50.
48
26 C.F.R. § 301.7605-1; T.D. 7146, 1971-2 C.B. 429; see Shaw, supra note 46, at
250–51.
49
See Shaw, supra note 46, at 250 (noting that the IRS’ interpretation of the statute
“resulted in instant ecumenism . . . . [T]he United States Catholic Conference, . . . the Union
of American Hebrew Congregations, and . . . the National Council, as well as quite a
number of other denominations acting separately, all attacked the Proposed
Regulations . . . .”).
44
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Over the next decade, both the IRS and the various churches it
interacted with felt for the boundaries, and the courts stepped in when
necessary.50 Ultimately, though, with such a cold reception to its 1969
statute, Congress took a second bite at the issue. This time, Congress
sought to set firmer boundaries on the Service’s ability to communicate
with churches on all matters, but it needed the requisite justification to do
so. As such, it proposed new legislation—CAPA—and held hearings on
the state of the IRS’ relationship with houses of worship as it stood in the
early 1980s.51 Under the watchful eye of Senator Charles Grassley, among
others, the Senate’s Subcommittee on Oversight of the IRS welcomed in
select witnesses from the government and the religious community to
testify to the environment created by the current law.52
Senator Grassley opened the proceeding by acknowledging the
deficiencies in the current law. Citing one example from several years
prior, he generalized the current state of affairs as a situation where
churches were being drained of financial resources, while seeing their
“integrity, character, and moral foundations” eroded “by innuendo, rumor,
and press coverage during extended [IRS] examinations.”53 Congressman
Mickey Edwards added that “many churches must deal with the [IRS] on a
regular basis,” but that while Congress had brought churches into the tax
code, it had failed to “spell out clearly enough its intended protection for
the churches.”54

50

See Coates, 692 F.2d at 633 (“The Church argues that [IRC] section 7605(c) was
intended to restrict all examinations of church records, including records of religious
activities during an investigation to determine tax exempt status. Such an intent, however, is
not evident in either the language or the legislative history of the statute.”); see also United
States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1099 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Indeed [IRC] § 7605(b) itself
expressly permits examination even of the religious activities of such an organization to the
extent necessary to determine whether the organization is entitled to exempt status by reason
of being a church.”); see also United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980)
(“The second prong of the Powell test was pruned back by Congress in 1969, in regard to
examination of churches, when it added subsection (c) to 26 U.S.C. § 7605. That provision
limits the inquiry into the religious activities and books of account of churches. . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
51
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38.
52
See generally CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 16. CAPA involved an impressive
range of co-sponsors along the political spectrum. In the House of Representatives, alone,
there were more than seventy comprised of “liberals, conservatives, boll weevils, gypsy
moths, members of the Black Caucus, and the Republican regulars representing a total of 30
States.”
53
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 1.
54
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 13.
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IRS Commissioner Roscoe Egger defended his agency’s right to
enforce the IRC with regard to churches,55 and reiterated that the Service
does not audit the “legitimacy or merits of individual religious belief.”56
After noting that IRC section 7605(c) was not added by Congress to lessen
the Service’s authority but actually to broaden it, Commissioner Egger
explained the underlying difficulty the IRS faces: “the Service usually has
the burden of obtaining information necessary to determine proper tax
status,” but because the tax code does not require churches to file
exemption applications or annual information returns, “the information is
in the custody of the . . . institution.”57 The lack of any previously filed
information forces the IRS to make inquiries into churches before and
during examinations.
The subcommittee then called what its most discussed witness, Mr.
Michael Coleman. Mr. Coleman served as the financial administrator of
Gulf Coast Covenant Church, which had recently completed an audit with
the IRS.58 Employing sensational rhetoric, he asserted, “The IRS has
proved over and over again that they cannot regulate themselves,”
explaining that Service personnel on the front lines of church audits possess
“an anti-church attitude” where a “church is guilty until proven innocent.”59
That particular audit did not result in an adverse determination to the
church, but Mr. Coleman included a ten-page exhibit outlining his church’s
frustration with the process.60 Other industry players also opined on the
proposed legislation, but seldom from the standpoint of personal
experience, as had Mr. Coleman. Representatives from the Presbyterian
Church in America,61 the Rutherford Group,62 and the National Association
55

See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 28 (citing to De La Salle Institute v. United
States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961); Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1197 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1009 (1970); Christian Echoes
National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 414
U.S. 864 (1973)).
56
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 28; see also CAPA Hearings, supra note 40,
at 29 (“We have recognized, for example, the exempt church status of organizations as
diverse in belief and practices as a fundamentalist Christian commune, a Hindu Ashram, a
group of secular humanists, and a sect worshipping pagan deities and practicing
witchcraft.”) (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
57
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 41; see also CAPA Hearings, supra note 40,
at 33 (“We learn about . . . churches collaterally from information supplied by complainants
or informants, a related party (e.g., minister, employee, contributor, affiliated organization),
or another service division.”) (statement of Roscoe L. Egger, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue).
58
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 67. Mr. Michael Coleman was also there in
his capacity as president of an organization called the National Integrity Forum.
59
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 68 (testimony of Michael Coleman, President,
National Integrity Forum).
60
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 73, 80–89.
61
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 89–97 (testimony of Robert L. Liken).
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of Evangelicals63 all seized an opportunity to stress the need for a more
restrictive law to curtail IRS involvement with churches.
The final panel assembled involved the closest thing to an IRS
apologist with the inclusion of Mr. William J. Lehrfeld, a former IRS
employee and, at the time of the hearings, an attorney representing
religious clients.64 Mr. Lehrfeld stood alone as an opponent to the statute,
noting that “the bill is flawed from a tax policy standpoint; it’s flawed from
a technical standpoint; and it creates . . . substantial constitutional
questions . . . [with] no justification . . . that there has been any substantial
abuse that cannot be rectified by and within the agency.”65 He acutely
noted that the proposed legislation seemed was a reaction to the audit
conducted of the Gulf Coast Covenant Church, which he believed was an
insufficient impetus to justify new legislation.66 Less than a year later,
CAPA became law as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.67
When the final version appeared—officially housed in IRC section
7611—it attacked the perceived problem of church audits from multiple
angles.68 IRC section 7611(a) sets forth two requirements that must take
place before the Service may even contact a house of worship.69 First, “an
appropriate high-level Treasury official” must reasonably believe that the
organization’s exemption is in question or that it is “carrying on an
unrelated trade or business.”70 Second, if such a determination is made, the
Service must provide prior notice to the organization of why it believes an
inquiry is necessary, the proposed subject matter of the inquiry, and the

62

See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 98–104 (testimony of Tedd N. Williams,
Exec. Dir., The Rutherford Inst.) (“[IRC § 7605(c)] has been interpreted to give the IRS
broad discretion . . . . Undoubtedly IRS has grown accustomed to this lack of restraint.
However, to allow this virtually unfettered discretion to continue will present opportunities
of abuse by overzealous IRS officials. . . . . This is not ‘doomsday prophesying’.”).
63
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 105–10 (testimony of Robert P. Dugan, Jr.,
Dir., Office of Pub. Affairs, Nat’l Ass’n of Evangelicals) (making reference solely to the
church administrator that testified earlier, Mr. Dugan stated, “Our concern is that the IRS in
its understandable zeal to curb mail-order ministries, tax protestors and abuses of the tax
laws seems determined to resist any attempt whatsoever to curtail its audit powers.”).
64
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 118–75. This panel also involved
representatives from the American Civil Liberties Union, the Evangelical Council for
Financial Accountability, and the National Council of Churches.
65
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 119.
66
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 119 (“[I]f the audit by the [IRS] of the Gulf
Coast Covenant Church is to be a paradigm for national legislation affecting all church
organizations, the hearing should get both sides of what actually happened.”).
67
Church Audit Procedures Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1033(a), 98 Stat. 494
(1984).
68
I.R.C. § 7611 (2018).
69
I.R.C. § 7611(a).
70
I.R.C. § 7611(a)(2).
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legal provisions that authorize and apply to the inquiry.71 Subsection (h)
defines such an appropriate official as “the Secretary of the Treasury or any
delegate of the Secretary whose rank is no lower than that of a principal
Internal Revenue Officer for an internal revenue region.”72
If the Service decides that an examination is necessary after making
its inquiry, it is limited as to the records it may examine and the religious
activities it may investigate.73 Further, an audit may only commence after
proper notice is given to the organization and to IRS regional counsel.74
Among other things, notice must contain a copy of the inquiry, a
description of the records and activities the Service wishes to audit, and an
offer for the Service and the organization to hold a conference together.75
If the regional counsel receiving the notice objects to the examination, they
may express their objection to the appropriate regional commissioner, who
has the authority to intervene in the planned audit.76 Most examinations
must be completed within two years, and inquiries without subsequent
examinations must be closed within ninety days.77 The statute permits the
IRS to conclude the audit with a notice of revocation or determination of
liability, but only after approval by regional counsel and only as it applies
to the three tax years preceding the examination notice date.78 Finally, if
the IRS has not complied with the provisions in CAPA, the church’s sole
remedy is to seek a stay in the proceedings until the noncompliance has

71

I.R.C. § 7611(a)(3).
I.R.C. § 7611(h)(7).
73
I.R.C. § 7611(b)(1). The IRS may only examine records and activities “to the extent
necessary to determine” whether the organization has any tax liability or whether the
organization is actually a church.
74
I.R.C. § 7611(b)(2)(A). The notice must be given to regional counsel at least fifteen
days prior to the commencement of the examination.
75
I.R.C. § 7611(b)(3)-(4). If the IRS determines that additional documents or activities
need to be examined after the examination commences, it generally has the authority to
audit them as well.
76
I.R.C. § 7611(b)(3)(C).
77
I.R.C. § 7611(c)(1)–(2). The statute provides for a tolling of the two-year period
upon certain triggers, such as (1) the filing of a related judicial action between the Service
and the organization, (2) the failure of the organization to comply with reasonable requests
for records, or (3) any period of time agreed upon by both parties.
78
I.R.C. § 7611(d). This section provides for shorter or longer statutes of limitation in
some instances. Subsection (f) provides that if no such determination is made, or if the
Service does not require “significant change” in the church’s operations, then the Service is
prohibited from commencing a second inquiry or examination on the same issues for a
period of five years (unless a high-ranking official permits it). Originally, this high-ranking
official was designated as the “Assistant Commissioner (Employee Plans/Exempt
Organizations)”, but that position was eliminated in 1998, and the language in subsection (f)
was changed to “Secretary.” Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 705 § 1102(e)(3)–(f)
(1998).
72
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been corrected.79
Shortly after the enactment of CAPA, the Treasury Department issued
regulations in a “Questions & Answers” format.80 Here, the IRS defined an
“appropriate high-level treasury official” as an “IRS Regional
Commissioner (or higher Treasury official).”81 This determination was
necessary to define which official was authorized (1) to approve a church
tax inquiry,82 (2) to determine when a church’s repeated failure to respond
to routine requests constituted the basis for a church tax inquiry,83 and (3)
to provide the written notice to commence a church tax inquiry.84 In
addition, the regulations clarify the role of “Regional Counsel” as to the
examination notice requirement85 and any final determinations reached by
the Service.86
While the fifteen years before the passage of CAPA were fraught with
uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the legislation that applied to the IRSchurch relationship,87 the fifteen years afterwards were relatively quiet
regarding the Service’s interaction with houses of worship. On the larger
front, though, Congress was slowly planning more sweeping action
regarding agency reform. This effort came to a head in the late 1990s and
affected every facet of the IRS.

79

I.R.C. § 7611(e).
26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1 (2019).
81
Id.
82
26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1(A-1) (“[T]he IRS may begin a church tax inquiry only when
the appropriate Regional Commissioner (or higher Treasury official) reasonably believes, on
the basis of facts and circumstances recorded in writing, that the organization (1) may not
qualify for tax exemption as a church; (2) may be carrying on an unrelated trade or
business . . . ; or (3) may be otherwise engaged in activities subject to tax.”).
83
26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1(A-7) (“Repeated (two or more) failures by a church or its
agents to reply to routine requests . . . will be considered by the appropriate [IRS] Regional
Commissioner to be a reasonable basis for commencement of a church tax inquiry under the
church tax inquiry and examination procedures . . . .”).
84
26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1(A-9) (“Upon commencing a church tax inquiry, the
appropriate Regional Commissioner is required to provide written notice to the church of
the beginning of the inquiry.”).
85
26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1(A-10) (“Where an examination is conducted . . . church
records or religious activities of a church may be examined only if, at least 15 days prior to
the examination, written notice of the proposed examination is provided to the church and to
the appropriate Regional Counsel . . . . At the time the notice of examination . . . is provided
to the church, a copy of the same notice will be provided to the appropriate Regional
Counsel. The Regional Counsel is then allowed 15 days from issuance of the second notice
in which to file an advisory objection to the examination.”).
86
26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1(A-11) (2018) (“[T]he Regional Counsel is required to
approve, in writing, certain final determinations that are within the scope of [IRC §] 7611
and adversely affect tax-exempt status or increase any tax liability.”).
87
See supra text accompanying notes 46–51.
80

AKINS (DO NOT DELETE)

16

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/27/2020 11:54 AM

[Vol. 44:1

C. The 1990s and the Passage of the IRS Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998
At the end of the twentieth century, Congress passed the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA 1998”).88 While CAPA
seeks only to address how the Service relates to churches, RRA 1998 seeks
to address how the Service relates to everyone. The effect was a
reorganized IRS acutely structured to accommodate specific types of
taxpayers.89 The agency effectively transformed into a constituent-focused
model that addressed taxpayer needs.90
The lead up to this reform, in part, traces back to the late-1980s when
the IRS finally secured funding from Congress for a major upgrade to the
agency’s information technology.91 The IRS made clear that the program
was expensive, but it struggled to keep pace with current tax administration
demands using decades-old technology.92 As soon as Congress awarded
the funds, though, the partnership began to sour. A series of government
Accountability Office reports released in the succeeding years scoured the
agency for shortcomings and malfeasance, and elected officials heard
increased murmurs from their constituents about customer service
shortcomings.93 By the mid-1990s, Congress took two steps to hem in the
Service. First, Congress began its withdrawal of funding for the Service’s
much needed technology upgrades.94 Second, and more importantly, it
formed a commission to explore the idea of reorganizing the agency.95 The
88

Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (1998).
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 62.
90
Herzig, supra note 31, at 30 (“The core concept was to view the taxpayer, not the
government, as client. As Commissioner Charles Rossotti stated, ‘[i]t is particularly
important that performance measures do not directly or indirectly cause inappropriate
behavior towards taxpayers, and that they provide incentives for service-oriented
behavior.’” (footnotes omitted)); see Leandra Lederman, Should Congress Reform The 1998
Reform Act: Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 992 (2003)
(“One of the changes brought about by the process of IRS reform was the now-standard
reference to taxpayers as ‘customers’ of the IRS.” (footnote omitted)).
91
Lederman, supra note 30, at 56 (noting that “Congress approved the IRS’s [Tax
Systems Modernization] plan” after its then-current technology resulted in “a very public
failure” when “a janitor at the IRS’s Philadelphia Service Center reported finding mangled
unopened returns in wastebaskets and in the bathroom, including checks . . . .” (footnotes
omitted)).
92
The technology upgrade plan “was created because the IRS had been struggling for
years to maintain systems that dated from the 1950s and 1960s.” Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/IMTEC-90-13, TAX SYSTEM MODERNIZATION: IRS’
CHALLENGE
FOR
THE
21ST
CENTURY
(Feb.
1990),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/212210.pdf).
93
Lederman, supra note 90, at 978 (citing Cong. Res. Serv., CRS Reports on Status of
IRS Restructuring and Reform (Mar. 22, 2001).
94
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 57.
95
Id.; see also Herzig, supra note 31, at 29.
89
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commission explored ways to remold the Service into a more efficient and
friendly governmental body.96
The committee’s work lived in obscurity for only so long. After it
released its findings in 1997, the committee’s recommendations were
discussed and debated in a very public way as the “political context
ultimately hijacked the process.”97 While the committee’s report faulted
the IRS for several of its shortcomings, it also showed that the issues were
partly Congress’ fault for its lack of oversight and failure to update the tax
code.98 A bill to act on these recommendations made its way through the
House, but the proposed legislation was put on hold as the Senate Finance
Committee decided public hearings would be necessary for America to
understand the full extent of the perceived abuses.99
The hearings, by design, showcased disillusioned IRS employees,
disgruntled taxpayers, cowed agency executives, and great amounts of
showmanship.100 Among the other spectacles, the hearing saw agency
employees testifying behind screens and the Bible used as a prop.101
Further, the Commissioner was directed to answer questions alone and
without the aid of his Assistant Commissioner or the Taxpayer Advocate,
who arguably was in better positions to answer Congress’s detailed and
case-specific questions.102 A current employee emphasized how the IRS
tactics were “literally ruining families, lives, and businesses—all

96
See Herzig, supra note 31, at 29 (“The purpose of Congressional intervention was to
further insulate the Service from pressures of both Congress and the Executive. The
commission made several recommendations focusing on oversight, technology, and
recovering damages.” (citing Cong. Res. Serv., CRS Reports on Status of IRS Restructuring
and Reform CR-2 (Mar. 22, 2001)); see also Lederman, supra note 30, at 57 (stating that
Congress formed the commission, in part, to explore whether the IRS should be reorganized
due partially to taxpayer complaints about burdensome audit processes and poor customer
service).
97
Lederman, supra note 30, at 58.
98
Lederman, supra note 90, at 978 (noting that the recommendations of the committee
included “restructuring Congressional oversight of the IRS, providing the IRS with a Board
of Directors, updating the IRS’s technology, requiring the IRS to develop a strategic plan for
increasing electronic filing of tax returns, increasing taxpayers’ ability to recover damages
in appropriate cases, and simplification of the tax law”) (citing Cong. Res. Serv., CRS
Reports on Status of IRS Restructuring and Reform (Mar. 22, 2001)).
99
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 58; see also Ryan J. Donmoyer, Three Days of
Hearings Paint Picture of Troubled IRS, 76 TAX NOTES 1655, 1655 (1997).
100
Donmoyer, supra note 99, at 1655 (“IRS employees and aggrieved taxpayers painted
a picture last week of an out-of-control tax administration agency so bent on fulfilling its
law enforcement mission that it will destroy innocent taxpayers rather than admit to a
mistake.”).
101
Donmoyer, supra note 99, at 1658 (“At times, the hearings featured theater that
bordered on absurd.”).
102
See Donmoyer, supra note 99, at 1657.
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unnecessarily and sometimes illegally.”103 A stream of taxpayers also took
the stand with stories ranging from gross incompetence to malicious
abuse.104
The IRS Commissioner apologized profusely at the hearing and
promised internal reform, but the din had grown too loud.105
Representative Michael Forbes conjured familiar language from the CAPA
hearings: “We saw a government agency totally out of control, lacking
accountability, an agency where one is guilty until proven innocent . . . .”106
By the time RRA 1998 was passed a year later, it made sweeping changes
to the agency.107 Among other reforms, the law restructured the Service
away from its geographical model toward a taxpayer-type based model.108
For the past half-century, the Service had been arranged by region.109
From top to bottom, it had one national office, multiple regional offices,
more than thirty district offices, and an organizational structure that
included employee titles such as “regional commissioner” and “regional
counsel.”110 Each region independently handled all examination and

103

Donmoyer, supra note 99, at 1655. (This same agent also spoke of how they believed
the agency preyed on the vulnerable segments of society that cannot defend themselves,
focusing audit efforts solely on the poor, and placing illegal wiretaps in employee
breakrooms.)
104
See Donmoyer, supra note 99, at 1656. (These witnesses involved a man who
claimed the agency coerced him into paying $250,000 to end an examination; a woman who
stated that the IRS had mixed up her records for the past 10 years, sending her into “a
vicious cycle” of legal issues; a Catholic priest who was harassed with tax notices regarding
his dead mother; and a couple who said the IRS’ mix-up of an employer identification
number led to an erroneous audit and cost them $11,000.).
105
Donmoyer, supra note 99, at 1657 (“The horror stories sent the IRS scrambling to
apologize. . . . IRS Acting Commissioner Michael P. Dolan conceded that there were
serious problems within the IRS and said that the agency ‘was wrong’ in the way it treated
the taxpayers who had testified . . . .”).
106
Lederman, supra note 30, at 59 (quoting Joint Review of the Strategic Plans and
Budget of the Internal Revenue Service, 1999, JCS-4-99, at 9 (May 25, 1999)).
107
Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (July 22, 1998).
108
Lederman, supra note 90, at 980 (citing Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 §
1001(a)). The legislation also established new oversight to improve accountability (creating
TIGTA and the IRS Oversight Board); See Lederman, supra note 30, at 62. The legislation
also revised and expanded the “Taxpayer Bill of Rights,” which included select provisions
that, if violated by a Service employee, would serve as grounds for termination; See
Lederman, supra note 90, at 981.
109
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 62 (citing Joseph J. Thorndike, Annual Regulation
of Business Focus: Reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service: Reforming the Internal
Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 762 (2001)).
110
See David Holmgren, THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND
REFORM ACT OF 1998 WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPLEMENTED BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN (2010)
[hereinafter
Holmgren
Memorandum],
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2010reports/2010IER002fr.html#governanceorgani
zationalstructure.
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collection functions.111 Statutes such as CAPA and IRS regulations were
written based on this structure.112 The new agency structure created four
new operating divisions, centrally located in Washington, D.C. The new
“customer-based” organization included divisions entitled, “Wage and
Investment,” “Small Business and Self Employed,” “Large & Mid-Size
Business,” and “Tax Exempt and Government Entities.”113 Each division
had national—not regional—authority over its specified types of
taxpayers.114
With the passage of RRA 1998, statutes like CAPA immediately
became problematic. Any attempt to draw parallels between the pre- and
post-reorganization organizational charts of the agency is akin to fitting
square pegs into round holes. Congress did not immediately amend
statutes affected by this phenomenon, nor did the IRS engage in a total
overhaul of the affected regulations. Instead, the agency clung to a
“savings provision” in RRA 1998115 intended to allow the Service to
operate without disruption, and it issued a delegation order offering general
rules on how it would handle the change in organization.116 In regard to
CAPA, this administrative patch quickly unraveled.
III. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROBLEMS
A. CAPA Under Strain
In Delegation Order 193, issued shortly after RRA 1998, the IRS
averred it had the power to take “actions previously delegated to . . .
Regional Commissioners . . . by Treasury Regulations . . . for matters under
their jurisdiction . . . and to delegate” those actions to Division
Commissioners and Directors, among other current agency officials.117
Using this order, the IRS placed the authority to make the “reasonable
belief” determination required to begin a church tax inquiry, formerly
assigned to a Regional Commissioner, to the Director of Exempt
Organizations, Examinations (“DEOE”).118 The DEOE, as the name
suggests, is an executive in the agency who has command over all
examinations of exempt organizations occurring in the United States.
111

Id.
See text accompanying notes 68 and 86.
113
See Holmgren Memorandum, supra note 110.
114
See Holmgren Memorandum, supra note 110.
115
Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(b), 112 Stat. 685, 689 (July 22, 1998); see also H.R.
2676, 105th Cong., Cong. Rep. 105-599, at 194 (1998).
116
Deleg. Order 193 (Rev. 6) (Renamed to Deleg. Order 1-23) (Internal Revenue
Manual § 1.2.2.2.20 (Nov. 8, 2000)).
117
Id. at ¶¶ 7–8.
118
See Internal Revenue Manual § 4.75.39. (Jun. 1, 2004).
112
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Among his or her duties, the DEOE oversees hundreds of employees,
develops procedures for how organizations are selected for audit, acts as a
technical expert in the areas of the IRC relevant to non-profit organizations,
and protects the integrity of the Service’s examination function.119 As such,
the IRS viewed the DEOE as the best fit to pass judgement on whether a
tax inquiry into a church was necessary.120
The Service’s efforts were short lived, however, as challenges
surfaced only a few years later. Most notably, a Minnesota organization
took exception to the agency’s interpretation of CAPA in a post-RRA 1998
environment.121
The organization, Living Word Christian Center
(“LWCC”), received its first correspondence from the IRS in 2007.122 The
Service, upon receiving reports that the organization may be giving its
pastor inappropriate benefits, sent LWCC a letter notifying it that the
Service was launching a tax inquiry into its affairs, signed by the DEOE.123
The church refused to comply, and the Service initiated an investigation.
After issuing a summons to the organization, LWCC raised the defense that
the investigation was invalid because the DEOE is not an “appropriate
high-level treasury official” for purposes of CAPA.124
At the core of LWCC’s argument was the idea that the old position of
Regional Commissioner was higher on the organizational chart than is the
current DEOE. The focus was on the word “rank” in IRC section
7611(h)(7), asserting that since the Regional Commissioner was only one
rank below the Commissioner’s office, only a similarly situated official
under the current structure would satisfy the statute.125 Since the DEOE is
four levels removed from the Commissioner, LWCC argued that it is not
equivalent to the Regional Commissioner in terms of rank.126 The
government stressed the futility of determining “rank” by simply counting

119
See United States’ Objections to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation at n.3,
United States v. Living Word Christian Center, No. 0:08-mc-00037-ADM-JJK (D. Minn.
Dec. 3, 2008).
120
Id. at 4–6.
121
See United States v. Living Word Christian Center, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6902 (D.
Minn. Jan. 30, 2009).
122
Id. at *1–2.
123
Id. at *2.
124
Id. at *2–3.
125
Id. at *4–7. (stating that CAPA defines an “appropriate high-level Treasury official”
as “the Secretary of the Treasury or any delegate of the Secretary whose rank is no lower
than that of a principal Internal Revenue officer for an internal revenue region.” I.R.C. §
7611(h)(7)).
126
United States v. Living Word Christian Center, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6902, at *8
(D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2009) (“The Court agrees . . . that the DEOE does not constitute an
appropriate high-ranking Treasury official.”).
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rungs on the ladder of the organizational chart.127 After all, there could be
no equivalent to the head of a geographic region when there were no longer
geographic regions.
Specifically, the government put forth the three arguments: first, the
IRS reassigned the authority for the “reasonable belief” determination
under CAPA to an executive who has broader and deeper authority than the
old Regional Commissioner.128 Such broader authority granted the DEOE
nation-wide jurisdiction, whereas Regional Commissioners had authority
over just one-seventh of the country at the time CAPA was passed. The
DEOE—which focused on examinations of exempt organizations—had
deeper authority than the Regional Commissioners who supervised a
broader range of exams.129 The second argument asserted by the
government was that the statutory construction of IRC section 7611 proved
Congress was not interested in simply counting steps in the organizational
structure.130 If so, they would not have placed the review for beginning a
second audit of a church in a position lower on the organizational chart
than the official tasked with authorizing a first audit.131 The government
lastly argued that its delegation of authority to the DEOE via informal
agency guidance was entitled to deference.132

127

Id. at *7–11.
Id. at *7.
129
See United States’ Objection to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation at 5-6,
U.S. v. Living Word Christian Ctr., No. 0:08-mc-00037-ADM-JJK (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2008).
(determining that “[T]he DEOE outranks the former regional commissioners in that the
DEOE oversees examinations of all tax-exempt organizations nationally, meaning she has
much greater authority over the examination of exempt organizations—including
churches—than the regional commissioners had over any type of taxpayer. Regional
commissioners oversaw examinations of exempt organizations only within their region—
approximately one seventh of the country at the time Congress enacted [IRC] § 7611 . . .
This greater authority over and familiarity with exempt-organization audits, including
church examinations, means the DEOE is—as Congress intended in mandating the 1998
reorganization—more focused on and attuned to the needs of exempt organizations”).
130
Living Word Christian Center, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6902, at *8.
131
Id. (noting that before RRA 98, a second inquiry into a church could only be
authorized by the Assistant Commissioner for Employer Plans and Exempt Organizations
per I.R.C. § 7611(f). This was an official three-levels removed from the Commissioner. The
Government had argued “that because the requirements for a second inquiry are more
stringent, and Congress allowed a lower ranking member to conduct this more sensitive
review even after the 1998 reorganization, Congress valued expertise over rank.”).
132
Id. at *10. The Government argued that under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944), it was entitled to judicial deference for its choice of delegation of the “reasonable
belief” determination of I.R.C. § 7611 because it was an exercise in the “IRS’ expertise and
experience in tax administration.” United States’ Objection to Magistrate’s Report and
Recommendation at 10 U.S. v. Living Word Christian Ctr., No. 0:08-mc-00037-ADM-JJK
(D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2008).
128
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The court, persuaded by the simple exercise of counting
organizational chart positions, declined to adopt any of the government’s
arguments. The court held that the DEOE was not a permissible official
under IRC section 7611(h)(7). The court instead believed that the Tax
Exempt and Government Entities (“TE/GE”) Commissioner was the
appropriate official, being two places higher up on the organizational
ladder than the DEOE.133 According to the statute, the court authorized the
government to resume its examination after it had corrected the issue.134
However, this resumed examination never happened. The government did
not appeal the case, nor did it file an “action on decision” acquiescing or
not acquiescing in the court’s ruling.135 Instead, the Treasury Department
proposed amended regulations that altered who it believed was an
“appropriately high-level Treasury official” for purposes of CAPA.136
These proposed regulations were published in 2009 and remain in the
“proposed” state today—never having been finalized nor withdrawn.137
They assert that the official who is most capable of making the reasonable
belief determination of IRC section 7611 is now the Director, Exempt
Organizations (“DEO”).138 As explained in the regulations, the DEO “is a
senior executive who reports to the Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner,
[TE/GE] Division, and who is responsible for planning, managing,
directing and executing nationwide activities for Exempt Organizations.”139
This designation sought to achieve a middle-ground between the agency’s
original interpretation that the DEOE was the best official and the LWCC
court’s view that the TE/GE Commissioner was the best choice.140 From
133
Id. at *10–11 (“This Court also ultimately finds the IRS’s interpretation unpersuasive
and . . . that the IRS’s summons be denied because it was not authorized by ‘an appropriate
high-level Treasury official.’”).
134
I.R.C. § 7611(e)(1)(A) (stating, in part, that if the IRS has not substantially complied
with the “notice requirements . . . with respect to any church tax inquiry or examination, any
proceeding to compel compliance with any summons with respect to such inquiry or
examination shall be stayed until the court finds” that the IRS has made “all practicable
steps to correct” the matter); I.R.C. § 7611(e)(2) (stating that this remedy is exclusive).
135
An action on decision signals whether or not the Service will follow an unfavorable
court ruling. The decision takes one of three postures: (1) Acquiescence, (2) Acquiescence
in result only, or (3) Non-acquiescence. Internal Revenue Manual § 36.3.1 (Mar. 14, 2013).
136
Amendments to the Regulations Regarding Questions and Answers Relating to
Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations, 74 Fed. Reg. 39003, 39004 (Aug. 5, 2009).
137
Id.
138
Id. at 39005 (“These proposed regulations eliminate references to the Regional
Commissioner and instead provide that the Director, Exempt Organizations is the
‘appropriate high-level Treasury official’ for purposes of the reasonable belief and inquiry
notice requirements of Treas. Reg. § 301.7611–1 Q1–A1, Q7–A7, and Q9–A9.”).
139
Id.
140
United States v. Living Word Christian Center, No. 08-mc-37, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6902, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2009) (“The nearest equivalent to the Regional
Commissioner under the current IRS organization is the [TE/GE Commissioner].”).
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the standpoint of the organizational chart, the DEO is three places removed
from the IRS Commissioner—one above the DEOE and one below the TE/
GE Commissioner.141 The proposed guidance also sought to clarify the
other positions referenced in IRC section 7611. The defunct Regional
Counsel’s duty to review and possibly file an advisory objection to an IRS
audit of a church was given to the current position of TE/GE Division
Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel.142 This same official was also tasked
with the duty to review certain final agency determinations.143 Further,
they placed the responsibility to review for a potential second audit of a
church in the TE/GE Commissioner.144
The issuance of the proposed amendments did not bring the issue to
resolution. Indeed, the agency’s problems in the CAPA arena only
escalated. Immediately after publication, the agency began receiving
comments from industry practitioners and advocacy groups, many
possessing varying degrees of the same reaction: they disliked the LWCC
court’s choice of the TE/GE Commissioner, and the IRS’s choice of the
DEO.145 Multiple comments suggested that the only official who can truly
achieve the intent of Congress in carrying out the “reasonable belief”
determination was the IRS’s Deputy Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement (“DCSE”)—an official immediately below the IRS
Commissioner.146 One commenter felt that only the IRS Commissioner or
the Treasury Secretary would do.147 At the other end of the spectrum, one
141
See I.R.M. 1.1.23.5.1 (Mar. 7, 2017) (showing that DEOE reports to the DEO);
I.R.M. 1.1.23.2(4) (Mar. 7, 2017) (showing that the DEO reports to the TE/GE
Commissioner).
142
Amendments to the Regulations Regarding Questions and Answers Relating to
Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations, 74 Fed. Reg. 39003, 39004 (proposed Aug. 5,
2009) (noting that the TE/GE Division Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel is the highest-level
legal advisor for the TE/GE Division). See I.R.M. 1.1.6.17(2) (June 18, 2015).
143
Amendments to the Regulations Regarding Questions and Answers Relating to
Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 39005 (“These proposed
regulations amend Treas. Reg. § 301.7611–1 Q11–A11 by providing that the Division
Counsel/Associate Chief Counsel, Tax Exempt and Government Entities, is the official
responsible for complying with the written determination and approval requirements of
section 7611(d)(1).”).
144
Id. at 39006 (noting that the regulations also provide that the Deputy TE/GE AC/DC
with authority over exempt organizations may make this decision).
145
See, e.g., Letter from Alliance Defense Fund, supra note 6; Letter from Caplin &
Drysdale to IRS, RE: Proposed Amendments to the Regulations Relating to Church Tax
Inquiries and Examinations (Oct. 13, 2009).
146
See Fred Stokeld, EO Director Shouldn’t Approve Church Audits, Witnesses Say, 65
TAX PRAC. 90 (Feb. 1, 2010).
147
See Martin, supra note 6, at 18 (“[T]he American Center for Law and Justice . . .
took an even more conservative approach by suggesting that this responsibility should rest
at least with the IRS Commissioner, if not the Treasury Secretary.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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comment applauded the IRS for the proposed regulations in the hopes of
bringing clarity to the issue and allowing the government to continue its
duty to hold these exempt organizations accountable.148
As litigation continued, the government became entangled in the
ambiguity of CAPA with everything from defending against a writ of
mandamus149 to a case involving the IRS’s authority to initiate a civil
assessment action against private individuals.150 In 2014, the IRS found
itself in a legal battle with an organization who demanded the agency to
release all of its documents related to “existing, proposed, new, or adopted
procedures for church tax inquiries or examinations from January 2009 to
the present.”151 The organization also requested all agency documents
related to the proposed changes to the regulations under IRC section
7611.152 This dispute over whether the agency had legally complied with
the Freedom of Information Act stretched over several years before the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the IRS’s
motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case in its tracks.153 Indeed,
this prolonged litigation, which was launched to prevent the IRS from
hiding “details of its illicit targeting of churches,”154 only came about
148
Letter from Americans United for Separation of Church and State to the IRS, RE:
Proposed Amendments to the Regulations Regarding Questions and Answers Relating to
Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations (Nov. 2, 2009) (letter on file with author) (“We
appreciate the IRS’ efforts . . . to clarify the enforcement responsibilities . . . Given the . . .
efforts by some organizations in recent years to encourage houses of worship to blatantly
violate federal law, having a clear and valid enforcement regime is absolutely essential”).
149
Southern Faith Ministries v. Geithner, 660 F. Supp. 2d 54, 55–56 (D.D.C. 2009)
(“Southern Faith Ministries seeks a writ of mandamus requiring a reasonable belief
determination from an ‘appropriate high-level Treasury official’ before the IRS can continue
its church tax inquiry.”). This case began before the proposed regulations were published;
Id. at 55 (noting that the letter in this case that initiated the church tax inquiry was signed by
the DEOE); Id. (ruling on the case after publication, though, deciding that the only remedy
available under IRC section 7611 was a stay in the proceedings—not a writ of mandamus);
Id. at 56.
150
United States v. Booth, No. CIV-F-09-1689, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105986, *6–7
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010) (“Defendants cite to [LWCC] but that opinion is inapposite . . . .
In the case at hand, there is no evidence that the change in officials is substantive as opposed
to an adjustment of forms.”).
151
All. Defending Freedom v. I.R.S., No. 15-525, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158473, at *1
(D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2017). This organization had filed a comment to the agency proposed
regulations in 2009 under a different name. See, Letter from Alliance Defense Fund, supra
note 6.
152
All. Defending Freedom v. I.R.S., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158473, at *1.
153
Id. at *15 (“In short, the Court is satisfied, based on the . . . detailed declarations
submitted by the IRS, that the agency conducted an adequate search for responsive
documents.”).
154
See Judicial Watch Files FOIA Lawsuit on Behalf of Alliance Defending Freedom
on IRS Investigations into Churches and Religious Groups, JUDICIAL WATCH (May 4, 2015),
https://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-files-foia-lawsuiton-behalf-of-alliance-defending-freedom-on-irs-investigations-into-churches-and-religious-
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because the agency was earlier sued by another organization claiming that
the IRS was not doing enough to examine churches.155
In the past few years, the IRS has taken lesser measures to end the
controversy. In 2016, the agency rewrote its procedures to state that a
church tax inquiry may begin when the DEO, “who acts in concurrence
with the TE/GE Commissioner,” makes the “reasonable belief”
determination.156 This evidences the closest the Service has come to
officially acquiescing to the LWCC court’s decision that the TE/GE
Commissioner is the correct official under the current agency
organization.157 Still, the drama continued.
In 2018, a United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina ruled that the agency’s half measure of tweaking its internal
guidance was not sufficient when it failed to strictly follow IRC section
7611’s requirements.158 In that case, an organization called Bible Study
Times (“BST”) claimed it was a church after an inquiry had been made.159
The IRS stopped the audit in order to go through its IRC section 7611
procedures, which included sending the organization a letter from the
DEO.160 However, under the revised agency procedures, the TE/GE
Commissioner reviewed this case before the audit began and signed an
internal document making the “reasonable belief” determination before the
commencement of the inquiry and examination.161 The BST court agreed
with the LWCC court that the TE/GE Commissioner was “comparable” to
the Regional Commissioner,162 and the court agreed that the TE/GE
Commissioner made the required determination before the examination
began.163 The IRS, however, lost the case because only the DEO’s
signature—not the TE/GE Commissioner’s signature—was on the inquiry
groups/.
155
See FFRF Sues IRS to Enforce Church Electioneering Ban, supra note 7.
156
See IRM § 25.5.8 (Jan. 27, 2016); § 4.75.39.1.1(6) (Oct. 30, 2017).
157
See Living Word Christian Center, No. 08-mc-37, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6902, at
*2–3.
158
United States v. Bible Study Times, 295 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608 (D.S.C. 2018).
159
Bible Study Times v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 3d 409, 415 (D.S.C. 2017).
160
Bible Study Times, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 610.
161
Id. at 610 n.3 (“[The Approvals Cover Sheet] reflects signatures (or substitutes for
signatures) of the DEO, the TE/GE Commissioner, and five other IRS officials under two
separate sections titled ‘Church Tax Inquiry Notice’ and ‘Church Notice of Examination.’”).
162
Id. at 627 (“Based on the language of the statute, the court finds the TE/GE
Commissioner’s ‘level’ or ‘rank’ the most significant consideration. Whether viewed from
the perspective of closeness to the IRS Commissioner or removal from the examination
function, the TE/GE Commissioner’s rank is comparable to that of a former Regional
Commissioner.”).
163
Id. at 630 (“Because the Government has made a prima facie showing the TE/GE
Commissioner made the Determination, it has made the necessary showing this statutory
requirement was satisfied.”).
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notice sent to the organization.164 The court reasoned that such an omission
was significant “because BST declined (or lost) the opportunity to address
the IRS’ concerns by less formal means while it (correctly) maintained the
DEO lacked authority to institute an Inquiry or Examination.”165
B. The IRS Under Strain
The IRS’s problem in regulating houses of worship in the face of an
unworkable statute is compounded because the agency is understaffed and
underfunded for the task.166 This, among other reasons, is a plausible
explanation as to why the Service has not taken more administrable action
in an area such as CAPA. As chronicled in recent years, the Service is
trending downwards in terms of its efficiency and effectiveness in
regulating the exempt sector and the taxpayer community.167
There are multiple factors contributing to this. First, the number of
exempt organizations has exponentially increased in the past forty years.168
In 1980, there were less than one million IRC section 501(c) organizations
on file with the IRS.169 In 2017, there were roughly 1.8 million.170 These
numbers are based on the number of organizations that have filed returns
with the IRS, since we only know about those who filed. As mentioned,
300,000 or more of these organizations are churches, which are not
required to file a return.171 Further, the IRS has also dealt with an
unbudgeted spike in exemption applications in the past decade. This was
partly due to a law mandating that any organization who had failed to file a
return for three consecutive years would automatically lose their taxexempt status.172
164

Id. at 631 (“In this case, the TE/GE Commissioner did not sign the Inquiry Notice
and the IRS did not otherwise disclose her Determination to BST at any point between when
the Inquiry Notice was signed . . . and when the Government filed its Reply in support of
the Petition . . . .”).
165
Id. (footnote omitted).
166
See Mayer, supra note 8, at 96 (commenting on the difficulty the Service faces in
trying to serve law abiding exempt organizations, and to correct the non-compliant behavior
of others, without the much needed resources “to keep pace with the size and complexity of
both the exempt organizations community and the applicable law.”).
167
See generally Owens, supra note 29, at 2–4; see also Lederman, supra note 30.
168
See Mayer, supra note 8, at 84 (citing I.R.S. 1980 Ann. Rep. 76).
169
Id.
170
I.R.S. Data Book 2017, at 51 (suggesting that the bulk of these organizations—over
1.7M—claim exemption under subsection (c)).
171
Id. at 55 n.4 (“Not all organizations described in section 501(c)(3) must apply for
recognition of tax-exempt status, including churches, interchurch organizations of local
units of a church, integrated auxiliaries of a church, conventions or associations of
churches. . .”); see also, id. at 85.
172
The IRS notified nearly 300,000 organizations of this action in advance, but not all
took the required steps to keep their exemption. The result was that many organizations lost
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Second, the Service’s resources have not kept pace with the increased
workload. Funding has decreased or remained stagnant in recent years.173
Even with the introduction of the revised tax code in 2018, the agency
failed to secure much needed funding from Congress.174 This decrease in
resources has affected staffing levels across the agency.175 While the
exempt organization employee group appeared to have avoid this general
decline in numbers, it has also failed to keep up with increase in demand.176
The decreased funding has also affected the breadth and quality of the
Service’s functionality.177 For example, funding for top agency executives
is below par compared to similar private sector positions.178 Further, those
within the agency are using older technology.179
their exempt status and had to reapply with the Service. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS 27 (2013); see also Lederman, supra note 30, at 47 (citing U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, GAO-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, BETTER COMPLIANCE
INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD
STRENGTHEN
OVERSIGHT
OF
CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS
30
(2014)
http://www.gao/gov/assets/670/667595.pdf; see also Memorandum from Michael R.
Phillips, Deputy Inspector General for Audit, TIGTA to the Acting TE/GE Commissioner,
Final Audit Report – Appropriate Actions Were Taken to Identify Thousands of
Organizations Whose Tax-Exempt Status had been Automatically Revoked, but
Improvements are Needed (Mar. 30, 2012) (Audit # 201110014).
173
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 70–71 (noting that in 2015, Congress gave the IRS a
budget that “was approximately eighteen percent lower than it was in 2010,” and in 2016,
Congress awarded the IRS a budget that “did not bring the IRS’s funding even up to its
2014 level.”).
174
Emily Horton, 2018 Funding Bill Falls Short for the IRS, CENTER ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/2018-funding-bill-fallsshort-for-the-irs (noting that the IRS will incur significant expense in implanting the Tax
Cut and Jobs Act, but that Congress’ funding “provides just $320 million from 2018 through
2019 for the IRS to implement the law. . . . [while] it cuts all other IRS funding by $124
million, leaving overall IRS funding a full $2.5 billion—18 percent—below the 2010 level,
adjusted for inflation.”).
175
See I.R.S. Budget & Workforce, Table 29, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/irs-budgetand-workforce (last visited Jan. 9, 2019). In 1988, the IRS had nearly 115,000 full-time
employees dedicated to running its various operations. That number has consistently
decreased over the past 30 years, and it stands at around 75,000 today.
176
See Mayer, supra note 8, at 87 (noting that for 2013 the IRS’s “Exempt Organization
Division . . . had about 20 percent more employees total than 38 years earlier. . . [but] during
approximately the same time period the number of [exempt] organizations has almost
doubled . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
177
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 73–74.
178
See Owens, supra note 29, at 5 (“The maximum base compensation of the Senior
Executive Service, the highest level of career employee in the federal government, is
currently fixed at approximately $179,700 or approximately the salary of a mid-level
associate in a large law firm.”).
179
See Owens, supra note 29, at 5 (“Historically, IRS internal management information
systems have been designed to track tax returns and related matters for for-profit
organizations and individuals, and then adapted to address some of the management
information requirements of the tax-exempt organizations function, which, of course, is a

AKINS (DO NOT DELETE)

28

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

1/27/2020 11:54 AM

[Vol. 44:1

Third, the Service has an image problem. As seen in the CAPA
hearings, complete with horror stories from practitioners and
parishioners,180 or the RRA 1998 hearings, complete with horror stories
from a wider audience,181 the IRS has a difficult time winning the favor of
the people—and thus Congress.182 This problem has ebbed more than
flowed over the years, and it recently surfaced with the so-called tea-party
scandal.183 Once again the IRS found itself in the political crosshairs as it
was accused of inappropriately scrutinizing right-wing organizations that
applied for exempt status.184
After another round of contentious
hearings,185 Congress again decided agency reform was necessary.186
Currently, the agency—especially the exempt organizations division—
finds itself in the familiar position of seeing little hope of increased funding
to fulfill its ever growing list of obligations.187
rational, economic approach to the task.”); see also, Lederman, supra note 30, at 75
(“Budget insufficiencies may also exacerbate the IRS’s longstanding deficiencies in
technology infrastructure. Much of the IRS’s current technology expenditures are still used
for upgrades to systems built in the 1950s and 1960s. A lot of its newer technology is
outdated, too.”).
180
See supra text accompanying notes 53–67.
181
See supra text accompanying notes 99–104.
182
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 70 (“IRS reform following a perceived scandal is
also likely to be focused on reining in the IRS, not on looking at the whole picture,
including whether the IRS has sufficient funding to effectively carry out all of the duties
Congress has given it.”).
183
See Memmott, Mark, IRS Apologizes For Singling Out Conservative Groups, NPR
(May
10,
2013,
12:41
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2013/05/10/182867374/irs-apologizes-for-singling-out-tea-party-and-patriot-groups
(“Saying that it was wrong, insensitive and inappropriate, a top official from the Internal
Revenue Service apologized Friday to conservative groups that were singled out for
additional IRS scrutiny during the 2012 campaign.”).
184
See Mullis, Steve, GOP Call For Inquiry Of IRS Targeting Of Tea Party Groups,
NPR
(May
12,
2013,
6:28
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2013/05/12/183438593/gop-call-for-inquiry-of-irs-targeting-of-tea-party-groups
(“Republican lawmakers on Sunday called for a full investigation. . . . ‘This is truly
outrageous,’ Republican Sen. Susan Collins of Maine said on CNN’s State of the Union. ‘It
is absolutely chilling that the IRS was singling out conservative groups for extra review.’”).
185
See generally Peters, Jeremy W., I.R.S. Official Invokes 5th Amendment at Hearing,
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013). The agency official at the center of the hearings was Lois
Lerner, who held the position of DEO at the time of the events in question. Her testimony
before the committee largely consisted of invoking her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. This resulted in strong rhetoric from Republican members of the committee.
Former Commissioner Douglas Shulman also took his turn before Congress and was pressed
by both sides.
186
See Lederman, supra note 30, at 67 (“Congress followed up the inflammatory
hearings that began in 2013 with legislation at the end of 2015. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, contained various restrictions on the IRS, including a subtitle
termed ‘Internal Revenue Service Reforms,’ part of the included PATH Act of 2015.”
(internal citations omitted)).
187
See Mayer, supra note 8, at 99 (“Realistically, not much more can be done with
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IV. A SUGGESTION FROM HERE
What is clear so far is that the IRS faces an increasingly difficult
battle in keeping up with the expansion of the charitable sector, especially
in its regulation of churches. This is partly because these organizations are
not required to file initial or annual returns, which would disclose
information about their finances and assure compliance with applicable
laws. The agency’s job becomes harder because it remains underfunded
and understaffed for the task coupled with poor prospects for change. The
issue is complicated by CAPA—a statute that provides specific statutory
protections shielding organizations claiming to be churches from advances
of the Service to gather or examine possible noncompliance issues. The
crowning jewel, of course, is that CAPA is irreversibly broken considering
the current agency structure. Without a doubt, fixing the issues created
with CAPA through RRA 1998 is possible, but that is not necessarily the
best path. When a law must be tortured to keep it viable, it is time for new
law or at the least, repeal of that law. The following section discusses these
options.
A. Repair CAPA
Aside from scholarly efforts, there has been no serious discussion of
repealing CAPA.188 Indeed, all efforts to fix the issues created by RRA
1998 center on re-interpreting the statute by administrative action.189 While
this is an impossible exercise given the complete tear-down and rebuild of
the IRS’s structure at the start of the twenty-first century, there is a way
forward if Congress refuses to act. It starts with the reality that it is
impossible to honor the statute’s text. Once acknowledged, it becomes a
simple exercise of trying to honor the spirit of the statute.
The purpose of CAPA is to provide clarity to the IRS and churches
about how they interact with each other. It also offers churches special
protections that are not available to similarly situated organizations.
Congress saw fit to accomplish these purposes, in part, by placing decision
making authority of whether or not to initiate contact with a house of
worship with an official possessing a politically sensitive perspective.190
CAPA generally defines such a person as “an appropriate high-level
respect to increasing the prominence of the exempt organizations function . . . Nor is a
significant increase in resources . . . likely in the foreseeable future, given both the financial
state of the federal government and the political unpopularity of the IRS.” (internal citations
omitted)).
188
See, e.g., Montague, supra note 10; Hoff, supra note 40.
189
See supra notes 136–144, 156 and accompanying text.
190
See I.R.C. § 7611 (2018). This same purpose was accomplished in the preceding
statute, I.R.C. § 7605(c), which also required an officer “no lower than a principal internal
revenue officer for an internal revenue region” to believe an examination was necessary.
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Treasury official.”191 When Congress more specifically defined this person
as “the Secretary of the Treasury or any delegate of the Secretary whose
rank is no lower than that of a principal Internal Revenue officer for an
internal revenue region,” it was dealing with an agency organization not
just conceptually realigned from what it is today, but also one that had
more rungs on the ladder.192 The new organization not only specializes
each operating division by taxpayer type, but it also flattens the structure,
centralizing control in a national office.193
It is too narrow of an exercise to simply point to a box on the current
organizational chart and see if it is at the same level as one on the pre-1998
organizational chart. Instead, the appropriate analysis should be to find an
executive that possesses familiarity with the IRS’s role in interacting with
houses of worship, familiarity with the IRS’s examination process, and
familiarity with making policy decisions at least at a regional level. All
these requirements may be found in the DEOE.194 As was argued by the
Government in the LWCC case, this official is more knowledgeable than
the Regional Commissioner in the specialized area of exempt organization
examinations, and this official has a wider scope of authority in that they
possess a national purview.195
Even after conceding the argument that the DEOE is inappropriate
because they are too close to the audit process, this is remedied by moving
the responsibility to make the reasonable belief determination to their direct
manager—the DEO. The DEO is the highest official in the IRS that deals
exclusively with exempt organization matters, including: (i) customer
education and outreach; (ii) rulings and agreements; and (iii)
examinations.196 The DEO, based in Washington, D.C., reports directly to
the TE/GE Commissioner and is “responsible for planning, managing,
directing and executing nationwide EO activities.”197
The IRS kowtowing to the reasoning of the LWCC court by naming
the TE/GE Commissioner as the appropriate Treasury official for purposes
of the IRC section 7611 “reasonable belief” requirement would arguably
191

I.R.C. § 7611.
See Modernizing America’s Tax Agency: IRS Organization Blueprint (Apr. 2000),
1–10 and 1–17, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/27877d00.pdf (noting that the post RRA
1998 organizational chart has roughly half as many steps between the Commissioner’s
Office and front-line employees).
193
Id. at 1–17; see generally Frank Wolpe, Getting Back to the “Grassroots” of Tax
Administration: Because “We the People” Long For a Gathering of American Eagles to
Restore Trust in the Internal Revenue Service with A Rebuild IRS Initiative, 49 AKRON L.
REV. 863 (2016).
194
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
195
See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text.
196
Internal Revenue Manual § 1.1.23.5(5) (Mar. 7, 2017).
197
Id. at (1)–(2).
192
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surpass the statutory requirement but would not be detrimental to tax
administration. Certainly, this should appease the judiciary. Whether it
was the LWCC court first making this determination,198 or more recently
the BST court announcing that “the positions of former Regional
Commissioner and current TE/GE Commissioner are each broader in some
respects than the other, though both clearly have broad
responsibilities[],”199 courts are clearly trending toward this solution to the
statutory problem.
The main caveat to having the TE/GE Commissioner be the substitute
for the former Regional Commissioner is that this solution creates an issue
regarding who would serve as the official designated to authorize a second
inquiry to a church. This responsibility was previously vested in the
Assistant Commissioner (Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations)
(“AC EP/EO”).200 Although the Assistant Commissioner is lower on the
organizational chart than the Regional Commissioner, the Assistant
Commissioner is the most knowledgeable person in the Service in regard to
exempt organizations.201
With nationwide authority over exempt
organizations and employee plans,202 the Assistant Commissioner’s role is
similar to the TE/GE Commissioner.203 Such authority makes the Assistant
Commissioner’s role a novelty among the issues created by RRA 1998.
The IRS indeed had a national official designated to serve a constituent of
taxpayers before the reorganization. It was this official that Congress gave
the authority to make the more sensitive determinations of re-auditing a
church after a first audit closed.204 In its proposed regulations, the IRS
suggested giving second-inquiry determination authority to the TE/GE
Commissioner.205 Obviously, giving the TE/GE Commissioner authority to
198

See United States v. Living Word Christian Ctr., 08-37 ADM/JJK, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6902, *10-11 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2009).
199
United States v. Bible Study Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 606, 627 (D.S.C. 2018).
200
26 U.S.C. § 7611(f)(1) (2018).
201
See Robert A. Boisture, Julie W. Davis, & Lloyd H. Mayer, How the IRS Plans to
Restructure Its Exempt Organization Operations, 10 J. TAX’N EXEMPT ORG. 5, 195–96
(1999); see also Owens, supra note 29, at 3.
202
See Boisture, supra note 201, 195–96; see also United States v. Living Word
Christian Ctr., 08-37 ADM/JJK 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6902 (D. Minn. Dec. 3, 2008).
(“[T]he [AC EP/EO] was the chief official in a component of the IRS that had specialized
experience in dealing with exempt organizations. Thus, Congress positioned authority for
initial church tax inquiries in a more generalized, regional official, but elevated the second,
more delicate inquiry decision to an official with a national perspective and specialized
knowledge . . . .”).
203
See Internal Revenue Manual § 1.1.23.2 (Mar. 7, 2017).
204
See I.R.C. § 7611(f) (2018).
205
See generally Amendments to the Regulations Regarding Questions and Answers
Relating to Church Tax Inquiries and Examinations, 74 Fed. Reg. 39003, 39006 (proposed
Aug. 5, 2009).
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make this second-inquiry determination would make it impossible for the
TE/GE Commissioner to also make the initial “reasonable belief”
determination. Thus, the IRS selected the DEO for the first “reasonable
belief” determination in its proposed regulations.206
The only untenable suggestion is to replace the role of the former
Regional Commissioner with the current position of DCSE. Doing so
would place individual audit decisions in the IRS Commissioner’s Office,
which would expressly go beyond what is necessary under CAPA. Though
several commenters suggested this approach in response to the IRS’
proposed regulations,207 there is no justification for this under the statute.
Even the primitive framework of counting rungs on the organizational
ladder shows the DCSE is higher than the former Regional Commissioner.
As the BST court explained, both the 1984 organizational chart (in place
when CAPA was enacted) and the current organizational chart possess a
Commissioner’s box at the top of the chart, containing the IRS
Commissioner and at least one Deputy Commissioner.208 The court
concluded, “Had Congress intended to make the Deputy Commissioner the
lowest official to whom authority to make the [IRC section] 7611
Determination could be delegated, it could easily have done so as such a
position existed in 1984. That Congress did not do so weighs against any
argument that would produce such a result.”209
Further, naming the DCSE as the appropriate official for the first
reasonable belief determination creates a problem as to who is the proper
official to conduct the second level determination under IRC section
7611(f). If the choice is to go further up the organizational ladder, this
would force the IRS Commissioner into making an individual audit
determination.
Going lower on the chart for the second-inquiry
determination also causes problems: whether one chooses the TE/GE
Commissioner or any other of the Division Commissioners, one would
require subordinates to make determinations on matters more sensitive than
and related to decisions previously made by their superiors.210
206

See supra note 134.
See supra note 146.
208
United States v. Bible Study Times, 295 F. Supp. 3d 606, 625 (D.S.C. 2018).
209
Id.
210
This scenario of having the DCSE make the first-inquiry determination and having
the TE/GE Commissioner make the second-inquiry determination was proposed by one of
the commenters to the IRS proposed regulations. The commenter believed that a secondinquiry determination under IRC § 7611(f) would also require a re-evaluation by the official
tasked with the original reasonable belief determination. The comment acknowledged that
requiring a subordinate to approve or overrule a request made by their superior was
problematic, suggesting that possibly a lower-official outside the chain of command of the
DCSE make the determination to avoid conflict. See Letter from Caplin & Drysdale to IRS,
supra note 145. What the comment fails to acknowledge, however, is that forcing the
207
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In short, either the DEOE or the DEO is adequate to fulfill Congress’s
intentions under CAPA. While the TE/GE Commissioner is an acceptable
choice as well to make the “reasonable belief” determination, this renders
filling the role of a second-inquiry determination problematic. Finally, the
choice of the DCSE to make the determination is both outside the
intentions of Congress and poised to create more problems than are already
present in this area. Of course, Congress could easily fix this issue by
amending CAPA and defining who is an appropriate official to approve a
church tax inquiry, but there is possibly a better path of legislative action—
repealing the statute altogether.
B. Eliminate CAPA
1. CAPA & RRA 1998 Were Political Overreactions
The aim of CAPA and RRA 1998 was to reform perceived abuses by
the IRS. The concerns brought to the public’s attention by Congress were
done to gain support for the desired reforms. In the case of CAPA, Senator
Grassley traced the origin of his interest to a testimony he had heard several
years earlier from a church representative who was unhappy with an audit
of his congregation.211 Through a nearly 200-page hearing record, the
CAPA proceedings mainly relied on the testimony of one aggrieved
church.212 The remainder of the testimony was filled with practitioners,
industry players, and policymakers debating the issue from a tax
administration viewpoint.213 Indeed, much of that debate was in relation to
CAPA’s predecessor, which appeared fifteen years earlier.214 Little to no
time was spent exploring alternative avenues to bring guidance to the
relationship between houses of worship and the IRS, or whether it was
needed.
With RRA 1998, the pattern was similar. Congress curated an invite
list of sensational witnesses to sell the public on how bad the agency’s
behavior had become. The collection of anecdotes at the hearing did not
cover a broad swath of abuses, but they painted a picture through graphic
anecdotes.215 While the fallout from the hearings took the form of a
Government into the choice between expertise and independence is not one contemplated by
the statute.
211
See CAPA Hearings, supra note 38, at 11 (stating that he first found this issue
worthy of considerable attention when he chaired a hearing where “testimony was presented
by a witness representing an audited church whose congregation spent thousands of dollars
and expended hundreds of man-hours during an examination”).
212
See supra notes 58–60.
213
See supra notes 61–66.
214
See supra notes 43–50.
215
See supra notes 100–104.
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sweeping agency reorganization, the testimonies that stirred this action
later proved to be unreliable. Witnesses either recanted their tales or
exaggerated the facts.216 Neither measure appears to have been motivated
by a desire for better tax policy. Instead, both acts had the appearance of
political maneuvers which turned out in several respects to harm tax
administration—CAPA by adding procedural hurdles to the process by
which the IRS approaches and examines houses of worship, and RRA 1998
by creating a vast transaction cost that has diverted agency resources away
from its tax administration and collection missions.217
Moreover, the purposes of both acts were misguided. CAPA’s goal
was to better protect churches by placing authority for initiating an IRS
inquiry into the hands of an “appropriate high-level treasury official.”218
Regardless of whether that high ranking official should be a director,
commissioner, or even a secretary, it does not acknowledge or address the
fact that offices as high as the President have historically weaponized the
Service’s audit process.219 Even if such actions by the executive are seen as
vestiges of the past, one does not have to look beyond the past few years to
find an agency head brought down because of knowledge, involvement, or
responsibility for taxpayer specific dealings.220
RRA 1998 intended to streamline agency accountability by
restructuring its organization. In creating a national office operating as an
agency brain over its four operating divisions, the reorganization changed
much to accomplish this accountability in service of its constituents.221 As
seen as recently as 2013, RRA 1998 did not stop accusations of gross abuse
of low-level employees giving inappropriate scrutiny to tax-exempt
216
Lederman, supra note 30, at 60 (“[T]he bona fides of many of the shocking
stories . . . are questionable. John Colaprete famously ‘has “recanted all this—he happened
to be out of the country” when this was said to have occurred. . . . The GAO ultimately
found many of the witnesses’ horror stories unfounded or exaggerated.’”) (citing Spellman,
Joe, Conference Panel Ponders Finance Hearing Horror Stories, 83 TAX NOTES 1854,
(quoting former IRS Commissioner Mortimer Caplin) and U.S. Gov’t Accountability
Office, GAO REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF IRS TAXPAYER ABUSE (May 24, 1999)).
217
See id. at 64 (“One result of the IRS Reform Act was a sharp downturn in collection
activity for several years. Audit rates, tax lien filings, levy notices served on third parties,
and seizures all dropped dramatically starting around the 1998 fiscal year . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Wolpe, supra note 193, at 890–92.
218
I.R.C. § 7611(a)(2), (h)(7) (2018).
219
See Herzig, supra note 31, at 22–26 (detailing executive misuses of the agency
beginning in the 1950s).
220
In May 2013, Acting IRS Commissioner Steven T. Miller resigned as the agency’s
head shortly after news broke of that the IRS may have been inappropriately targeting
conservative groups applying for tax-exempt status. See Josh Hicks, Steven Miller’s
Resignation Memo to IRS Employees, WASH. POST (May 16, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2013/05/16/steven-millersresignation-memo-to-irs-employees/?utm_term=.8ba8f49a8c1f.
221
See Wolpe, supra note 193, at 870.
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applications.222 The issue was addressed by national office officials who
spoke without a complete understanding of, or control over, the facts. In
sum, an argument that the old decentralized, regional authority structure
might be the better avenue for holding employees of all levels accountable
gained traction.223
As for the question of how the IRS-church relationship can exist in an
appropriate and administrable fashion in the present environment, the
organization of the agency matters less than the church specific rules. As
such, the focus of reform should be on changing or eliminating CAPA, not
on rethinking RRA 1998. For while the agency restructuring has its
drawbacks, it does add expertise to the field of exempt organizations—like
houses of worship—by designating groups of agency personnel to
specifically serve this type of taxpayer.224 In other words, CAPA was an
overreaction in 1984 when the IRS was regionally organized, and it is
unnecessary today, where the agency is designed, in part, to specifically
serve exempt organizations.
2. Bring Houses of Worship into The Fold
Under the premise that CAPA was a political overreaction at its
inception and is currently unworkable, there are two paths forward that
would make this area more administrable for the IRS and less intrusive for
churches. First, Congress could simply repeal CAPA and allow the IRS to
use its existing exempt organization audit procedures (along with the
accompanying safeguards) to govern its audits of churches.225 Under this
solution, courts would still be there to referee the relationship. It would,
however, allow the IRS to treat houses of worship and their affiliates the
same as it treats other organizations that claim tax-exemption. Given that
this exam function no longer remains under agency generalists, but rather
under national executives focused on serving exempt organizations, the
process would entail the appropriate accountability to assuage any
reasonable concerns of the church community.
Second, Congress could bring churches into the filing regime that
currently applies to most other exempt organizations—religious and nonreligious alike. At present, the treatment of churches by the tax code
arguably creates more constitutional concerns than it solves. Churches do
222

See Mullis, supra note 184.
See Wolpe, supra note 193, at 893–97 (Professor Wolpe mounts an energetic and
unapologetic argument that RRA 1998 was a “mammoth misstep” that should be
abandoned, which “would mean a joyous homecoming for a greatly updated successor
structure to the 1952–1998 style Classic District Office, which was the best architecture the
IRS ever enjoyed”).
224
See Lederman, supra note 90, at 980.
225
See Internal Revenue Manual §§ 4.75.4–.39 (Sept. 9, 2016).
223
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not need to apply for exemption or provide an annual filing, and many do
not.226 Even with CAPA, though, the IRS is not off the hook from making
inquiries into and investigating houses of worship, so the agency has an
obligation to involve itself with these organizations as necessary. With
organizations that file applications and annual returns, the IRS has basic
information about the organizations. Whether this occurs on a version of
the Form 1023 or a version of the Form 990, the agency does not have to
feel around blindly. With churches that do not file, however, the agency’s
need to make an inquiry is exponentially more necessary as it must inquire
about even the most basic of information—information that might be
provided on one of the forms.227 Many church tax inquiries may never
have to begin if the IRS could reference a simple filing to obtain
information. This is not to say that churches should be subject to a more
extensive filing process than applies to similarly situated organizations, but
only that Congress might find it appropriate to require some minimal
amount of annual information from churches.228
Of course, the options of repealing CAPA and instituting a basic filing
requirement do not have to be mutually exclusive. Such reforms, though,
might be best served in baby steps. Under a plan where the regulatory
landscape changes to eventually include repealing both CAPA and the
filing exemption for churches, the logical order is to impose the filing
requirement first. This would allow houses of worship to funnel into a
relatively unobtrusive filing regime while still protecting them with extra
safeguards in the event the IRS makes an inquiry. Once both the IRS and
houses of worship gain a comfort level with this new status quo, CAPA
should be able to fall away with little fanfare.
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress passed the Tax Cut and Jobs Act in late 2017, it had
an opportunity to fix many of the quirks that had found their way into the
IRC since its last major revision. While the Act succeeded in some
respects, it failed in others. Most notably, it failed to change portions of the
code that are, by design, only workable under the pre-RRA 1998 structure
of the IRS. This was the case with CAPA and all its various references to
now obsolete regional positions within the agency. The Service attempted
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See I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A) (2019).
See supra text accompanying notes 14–23.
228
The Form 99-N (e-Postcard) may be a logical place to start. It only requires eight
pieces of information, which are readily available to the filing church and helpful in
answering basic questions about the organization’s structure and operations. See I.R.S.,
Information
Needed
to
File
e-Postcard,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/information-needed-to-file-e-postcard (last updated May 13, 2019).
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to solve this issue and failed. Courts have waded into the waters as well,
and the issue still persists. The IRS, which is increasingly under-resourced
to carry out its duty of monitoring exempt organizations such as churches,
is left with three options on how to proceed under the current statutory
framework: First, it can maintain its stance that the DEO is the appropriate
official to authorize a church tax inquiry. Second, it can agree with the
courts that the higher ranked TE/GE Commissioner is adequate. Finally, it
can kowtow to the practitioners who insist that no official ranked lower
than a Deputy Commissioner will do. However, all these avenues have
their drawbacks.
The simple solution would be for Congress to acknowledge the
difficulty the Service faces and either amend CAPA or repeal it entirely.
Placing houses of worship on par with similarly situated organizations
would not unreasonably lessen the protections available to these
organizations. Further, requiring these organizations to comply with some
minimal filing obligation might save the Service from ever needing to
make inquiries in the first place. Regardless of the path chosen, the only
constant we can glean from history is that for any change to be successful,
Congress must bypass the circus of theatrical hearings in favor of reasoned
devotion to workable tax policy.

